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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE LEGALIZATION OF WORLD POLITICS AND THE FUTURE OF
U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY

DEREK P. JINKS*
The accelerating pace of globalization and economic liberalization have
placed traditional conceptions of state sovereignty under unprecedented strain.
These processes have simultaneously enabled transnational actors to conceive
of problems of governance as global and strengthened the commitment of these
actors to the pursuit of common objectives through multilateralism. The
prospect of effective modes of “global governance” has, in turn, raised vexing
questions about the optimal allocation of regulatory authority. The territorial
limitations of state regulatory power clearly limit the capacity of states to
govern effectively with respect to many transnational problems. Nevertheless,
the nation-state retains its status as the primary political actor in global
politics.1 Indeed, global governance is mediated through international
institutions whose design, legitimacy, and purpose originate in and derive from
the authority of sovereign states.
Because of these developments, national governments are, by and large,
committed to the development of effective international institutions even as
they strive to insulate national decision-making processes from international
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. This response benefited
greatly from the generous input of several colleagues including Harold Hongju Koh, Joel
Goldstein, Ryan Goodman and David Sloss.
1. See, e.g., Eyal Benvenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization, 98 MICH. L. REV.
167, 168 (1999). Although the optimal allocation of regulatory authority has certainly changed,
nation-states continue to be the most important and influential actors in world society. See, e.g.,
Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 184 (1997). In fact,
many scholars have argued that the regulatory capacity of states has not eroded significantly in
the twentieth century. See, e.g., STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY
(1999); Geoffrey Garrett, Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous
Circle?, 52 INT’L ORG. 787, 788 (1998) (arguing that globalization has not significantly
constrained domestic policy choices); Janice E. Thomson & Stephen D. Krasner, Global
Transactions and the Consolidation of Sovereignty, in GLOBAL CHANGES AND THEORETICAL
CHALLENGES: APPROACHES TO WORLD POLITICS FOR THE 1990s, at 195, 206 (Ernst-Otto
Czempiel & James N. Rosenau eds., 1989) (arguing that state control over cross border flows has
not significantly eroded); Janice E. Thomson, State Sovereignty in International Relations:
Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research, 39 INT’L STUD. Q. 213, 214 (1995)
(“State control has waxed and waned enormously over time, regions, and issue-areas while the
state’s claim to ultimate political authority has persisted for more than three centuries.”).
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supervision. United States human rights policy clearly exhibits this dual
orientation to the international order. The United States has, of course, been an
important player in the development and enforcement of international human
rights law even as it has resisted the application of international human rights
law to itself.2 The central problem is whether this contradiction—irrespective
of whether it is understood as a “double standard” or a “structural tension” —
can be negotiated in principled and pragmatic ways. In this Comment, I offer
two suggestions to guide further exploration of this problem. First,
international lawyers and policy-makers must acknowledge that these
contradictory impulses reflect deep conflicts between important liberal values.
Second, international human rights law should address these conflicts directly
through the elaboration of “principles of accommodation” that would define
more clearly (and sensibly) the relationship between international and domestic
law.
Building effective institutions to define and enforce international human
rights standards3 presents many confounding problems.4 Two types of
concerns predominate. What norms should, as a matter of principle, qualify as
universal human rights standards? And, what institutional arrangements would,
as a practical matter, make violations of these standards (however defined) less
likely and less frequent? In his illuminating and inspirational essay, Harold
Hongju Koh, Yale Law professor and former Assistant Secretary of State for
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, offers nothing less than a principled
Because I
and pragmatic manifesto for U.S. human rights policy.5
fundamentally agree with the substance of Professor Koh’s recommendations,
I aim simply to clarify and analyze an important structural tension in the
international legal and political order that greatly complicates the task of

2. See Jack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law & the United States Double
Standard, 1 GREEN BAG 365, 365 (1998).
3. The most prominent agreements are, in chronological order: the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78
U.N.T.S. 277; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, adopted, opened for signature and ratification Dec. 21, 1965, 60 U.N.T.S. 195;
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted, opened for
signature, ratification and accession Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, adopted Dec. 18,
1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, adopted, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; and
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1448.
4. See Laurence R. Helfer, Concretizing Human Rights Law, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 533, 535-36 (1998); HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY (Louis Henkin
& John Lawrence Hargrove eds., 1994).
5. Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 293 (2002).
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fashioning an appropriate U.S. human rights policy. In short, I argue that the
principled incorporation of international human rights norms into domestic law
should be one of the pillars of U.S. human rights policy.
As Professor Koh points out, two related macro-level developments are
redefining the nature of world politics: the “globalization of freedom”6 and the
“globalization of terror.”7 Since September 11th, the centrality of this tension
is beyond dispute. Overemphasis of this dynamic, however, risks obscuring the
contradictory impulses that have characterized the “globalization of freedom”
itself. More specifically, the “globalization of freedom,” at a high level of
generality, has involved two related developments: the “globalization of
human rights” and the “globalization of democracy.” In many important ways,
these two trends are mutually reinforcing. In at least one crucial sense, they
are, however, arguably in tension. The difficulty is clear: An increasingly
precise body of universally-applicable human rights standards developed
through various global associational processes will increasingly constrain the
policy options of nation-states. Democratic polities will be governed, in part,
by exogenously-defined legal norms. As a consequence, one of the most
important challenges of the twenty-first century will be to articulate and
institutionalize rules that govern the relationship between international law and
domestic law.
This problem is, of course, particularly acute for U.S. human rights policy.
Although the United States actively promotes universal human rights
standards, it also actively resists the application of international human rights
norms in domestic law. For example, courts in the United States routinely
reject claims brought under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) without consideration of their merits because the President
and Senate have attached conditions to U.S. ratification of the treaty.8 Both
sides of this “double standard” reflect important principles of international
society: state sovereignty and fundamental human rights. The prospects for a
durable, just international order turn on the degree to which these two
principles are mediated. My central thesis is that U.S. human rights policy
should promote the legalization of international human rights standards by
pursuing the “principled accommodation” of its national interests.

6. Id. at 295.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Domingues v. State, 961 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Nev. 1998); Newman v. Deiter, 702
N.E.2d 1093, 1098-99 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 329 (1999); United States v.
Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 19 F. Supp. 2d 738, 741 (E.D. Mich. 1998), rev’d
and remanded, 204 F.3d 658, 668 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Any & All Radio Station
Transmission Equip., 976 F. Supp. 1255, 1256 (D. Minn. 1997), rev’d and remanded, 169 F.3d
548, 554 (8th Cir. 1999), superseded by 207 F.3d 458, 462 (8th Cir. 2000); Ralk v. Lincoln
County, 81 F. Supp. 2d 1372, 1380 (S.D. Ga. 2000).
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I. LEGALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
In the final decades of the twentieth century, international human rights
institutions have assumed an increasingly legal character.9 This “legalization”
of human rights institutions, which represents one instance of the broader trend
of legalization of international institutions generally,10 is characterized by three
9. The ICCPR established the United Nations Human Rights Committee (HRC or
Committee) to monitor State parties’ compliance with the treaty. See ICCPR, supra note 3, art.
40(4). This monitoring function involves three complementary procedures. First, the ICCPR
establishes a periodic reporting process. See id. at art. 40(1). Under the reporting process, the
Committee receives periodic written reports from State parties which explain the measures they
have taken to protect the rights recognized in the treaties. See id. Government representatives
present the reports to the Committee in public sessions; Committee members question the
representatives about issues raised in the reports and the Committee publishes comments and
recommendations on how to improve the protection of human rights in the State in question.
Second, the Committee drafts “general comments” typically concerning the interpretation of the
substantive rights and freedoms contained in the treaty each Committee oversees. See, e.g.,
DOMINIC MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 95 (1991) (“The general
comments serve rapidly to develop the jurisprudence of the HRC under the Covenant.”). Third,
and most important, the Committee receives written “communications” or “petitions” from
individuals alleging that a State party has violated one or more rights protected by the ICCPR.
See Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted,
opened for signature, ratification and accession Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 302 [hereinafter
First Optional Protocol]; Torkel Opsahl, The Human Rights Committee, in THE UNITED NATIONS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 370 (Philip Alston ed., 1992). This procedure is
optional, however, and many States party to the ICCPR do not recognize the competence of the
Committee to receive individual petitions.
See Human Rights Committee, at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/hrcommittee/hrc-page.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2002)
[hereinafter Optional Protocol] (stating that 95 of the 144 parties to the ICCPR have ratified the
First Optional Protocol). Under the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, the Committee
performs a quasi-judicial function when reviewing individual petitions. If numerous admissibility
requirements are satisfied, the Committee determines the merits of the complaint. See TOM
ZWART, THE ADMISSIBILITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS PETITIONS: THE CASE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE (1994). Note that the
Committee’s decisions are not legally binding, although many view them as persuasive authority,
and several states have implemented the Committee’s interpretation of the treaty. See Laurence
R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication,
107 YALE L.J. 273, 344 (1997).
10. See, e.g., Judith Goldstein et al., Legalization and World Politics, 54 INT’L ORG. 385
(2000); Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of
the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 709 (1999); see also THE ROLE OF LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Michael Byers ed., 2000). One strong indicator of increasing levels of legalization in
international institutions is the proliferation of international and supranational tribunals. See
generally MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (Philippe Sands et al. eds.,
1999) (compiling basic documents concerning all existing international judicial bodies, as well as
several other quasi-judicial, implementation, control and dispute settlement mechanisms). These
include: the International Court of Justice (ICJ) (governed by U.N. CHARTER arts. 7(1), 36(3), 92-
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related developments: (1) increasingly obligatory norms; (2) increasingly
precise norms; and (3) the delegation of authority to supranational bodies to
interpret, implement, and apply these norms. 11
Further legalization of international human rights institutions promises to
strengthen substantially the durability and viability of international human
rights regimes. Legalization tends to bolster the credibility of normative
commitments,12 increase compliance with international norms,13 and provide a
96); the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) (governed by U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), art. 287, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982)) (Part XV, § 2 of the UNCLOS is
dedicated to the peaceful settlement of disputes and the ITLOS Statute is contained in Annex VI
of the UNCLOS); the European Court of Human Rights (governed by Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, entered into force on Sept. 3, 1953, as
amended by Protocol 11 to the European Convention on Human Rights, 213 U.N.T.S. 222); the
Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) (governed by Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community, entered into force Jan. 1, 1958, 298 U.N.T.S. 11); the
International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (governed by Security Council
Resolution on Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia, U.N. SCOR, 3217th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993)); the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) (governed by Security Council Resolution on
Establishing an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in Rwanda, U.N. SCOR, 3453rd mtg.
at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994)); and the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) dispute
settlement mechanism (governed by General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade
Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, 33
I.L.M. 1125, 1226-47 (1994)) (Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes).
11. See Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L. ORG. 401 (2000)
(defining the concept of international legalization as a form of institutionalization characterized
by three dimensions: obligation, precision, and delegation).
12. See, e.g., LISA L. MARTIN, DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS: LEGISLATURES AND
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (2000); Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft
Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L. ORG. 421 (2000); Miles Kahler, Legalization as
Strategy: The Asia-Pacific Case, 54 INT’L. ORG. 549 (2000); Miles Kahler, Conclusion: The
Causes and Consequences of Legalization, 54 INT’L. ORG. 661 (2000).
13. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 17-23 (1995); THOMAS M.
FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995); Harold Hongju Koh,
Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997); Harold Hongju Koh,
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996).
Some empirical evidence suggests that the legalization of institutions does not
necessarily increase levels of compliance. See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 12, at 421
(noting the many advantages of “soft legalization”); Ellen L. Lutz & Kathryn Sikkink,
International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America, 54 INT’L. ORG. 633 (2000)
(arguing that increased legalization does not explain increased compliance with human rights
norms in Latin America); Ronald B. Mitchell, Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil Pollution
and Treaty Compliance, 48 INT’L. ORG. 425 (1994) (suggesting that some international regimes
are efficacious because their mechanisms for compliance are decentralized); John J. Mearsheimer,
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highly rationalized mode of clarifying and resolving interpretive
disagreements.14 The transformation of human rights norms into “hard law”
also necessarily entails significant “sovereignty costs” in that national action is
evaluated by international actors applying international norms. Moreover,
these constraints on sovereignty are often concentrated in issue-areas that
directly impact important national interests.15
The range of justificatory practices utilized by states demonstrates the
importance of these issues. Broadly conceived, states employ two types of
justifications for controversial practices. First, states assert that unique
contextual factors justify an idiosyncratic substantive interpretation of
international human rights norms.16 Second, states suggest that extraordinary
circumstances (that rise to the level of a national emergency) justify temporary
suspension of certain fundamental international rights guarantees.
In
international human rights law, “derogation regimes” define the degree to
which states may suspend rights protections in formal states of emergency17
and “limitations clauses” authorize restrictive interpretations of certain human
rights norms when necessary to promote important national interests.18 These
concepts are secondary or “interstitial” rules regulating the circumstances in
which other rules, here the primary human rights norms, are applicable.19 I

The False Promise of International Institutions, 19 INT’L SEC. 5 (1994) (arguing that
international institutions do not have a significant impact on state behavior).
14. See, e.g., Robert Keohane et al., Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and
Transnational, 54 INT’L. ORG. 457 (2000); Abbot & Snidal, supra note 12, at 421.
15. See DELEGATING STATE POWERS: THE EFFECT OF TREATY REGIMES ON DEMOCRACY
AND SOVEREIGNTY (Thomas M. Franck ed., 2000); Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy
and the Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The Example of the European
Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 677 (1999); Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International
Institutions, and the Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944,
1944-45 (1997) (arguing that the “practical devolution of decisionmaking authority to
international institutions is the essence of the loss of national sovereignty” and that “it is a process
that will continue as the forces of globalism accelerate in the next century”).
16. I have explored this theme in previous work. See Derek P. Jinks, The Anatomy of an
Institutionalized Emergency: Preventive Detention and Personal Liberty in India, 22 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 311 (2001).
17. See generally ANNA-LENA SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATES OF EXCEPTION (1998); JOAN FITZPATRICK, HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CRISIS: THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM FOR PROTECTING RIGHTS DURING STATES OF
EMERGENCY (1994); JAIME ORAA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN STATES OF EMERGENCY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1992).
18. See generally Alexandre Charles Kiss, Permissible Limitations on Rights, in THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 290 (Louis
Henkin ed. 1981).
19. See Vaughn Lowe, The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of Norm
Creation Changing?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 10, at 21221.
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refer to these concepts as “accommodation principles,”20 in that they determine
the degree to which international law authorizes departures from established
international rules in certain specified “states of exception.”21
Of course, states often also assert that domestic policy preferences
concerning such sensitive matters cannot be meaningfully constrained by
international human rights law because international human rights law acquires
meaning only through the application of norms in domestic practices.22 In the
20. For an interesting discussion of a similar dynamic in the international trade context, see
Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and
Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 193, 194 (1996) (“It would seem clear
that the [relevant] international agreement does not permit a national government’s determination
always to prevail (otherwise the international rules could be easily evaded or rendered
ineffective). . . . [However, the very notion of sovereignty suggests that international bodies]
should respect national government determinations, up to some point.”).
21. National security exceptions provide an excellent example. Hannes L. Schloemann and
Stefan Ohlhoff described the problem succinctly.
National security is the Achilles’ heel of international law. Wherever international law is
created, the issue of national security gives rise to some sort of loophole, often in the form
of an explicit national security exception. As long as the notion of sovereignty exerts
power within this evolving system, national security will be an element of, as an
exception to, the applicable international law.
Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan Ohlhoff, “Constitutionalization” and Dispute Settlement in the
WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AMER. J. INT’L L. 424, 426 (1999).
“National security” may be invoked as a justification for the abrogation or qualification of
international legal obligations in many issue areas including international trade law. See The
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, art. XXI, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; GUIDE TO
GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 599-610 (rev. 6th ed. 1995). Article XXI of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) provides for a general exception to all GATT obligations with
respect to disclosure of national security information, regulation of fissionable materials,
regulation of traffic in arms, and action in pursuance of U.N. Charter obligations related to the
maintenance of international peace and security. See also JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 983-86 (3d ed. 1995); JOHN H. JACKSON,
WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 748-52 (1969); Michael J. Hahn, Vital Interests and the
Law of GATT: An Analysis of GATT’s Security Exception, 12 MICH. J. INT’L L. 558 (1991).
22. Many new constitutions explicitly make international law part of domestic law. See,
e.g., PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH BILLS OF RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES
(Philip Alston ed., 1999); S. AFR. CONST. ch. 14 § 232; see also The Human Rights Act of 1998
(U.K.),
available
at
http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980042.htm
(incorporating wholesale the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law). In the
United States, “foreign affairs exceptionalism”the notion that the usual constitutional
constraints on the government’s power do not apply in matters relating to foreign affairshas
recently come under tremendous strain. See, e.g., G. Edward White, The Transformation of the
Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1999); Jack L. Goldsmith,
Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1618 (1997); Laurence
H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in
Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1226 (1995). The classic in this area
remains LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2d ed.
1996).
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United States, several scholars argue that constitutional principles preclude
giving independent domestic legal effect to customary international law23 and
certain types of treaties.24
The question is whether international law imposes any “limitations on
To what degree may states invoke contextual
[these] limitations.”25
circumstances to justify specific domestic policy choices? To what degree
may states invoke contextual factors to justify restrictions on rights? These
questions are merely academic puzzles in an institutional environment
unregulated by precise, obligatory norms. These issues, however, will assume
tremendous importance as international human rights law acquires more of the
characteristics of a fully developed legal system.26
The emerging tension between internationalism and constitutionalism
threatens to compromise the ability of either approach to accomplish its central
objective: the realization of humane and effective governance. International

23. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 816 (1997);
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of International
Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2260, 2260 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist
Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529 (1999). The recent
ascendancy of this view has prompted extensive critical commentary. See, e.g., Harold Hongju
Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824 (1998); Gerald L.
Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Response to Professors
Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 371-72 (1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of
Our Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law after Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393,
395 (1997); Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga’s Firm Footing: International Human
Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 463, 471-72 (1997).
24. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L.
REV. 390, 391 (1998) (arguing that federalism concerns should invalidate treaties that do not
regulate genuinely international matters); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties,
Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2093 (1999)
(arguing that “courts should obey the presumption that when the text of a treaty is silent, courts
ought to assume that it is non-self-executing,” meaning, in his view, that the treaty is not the
“supreme law of the land”). For an extended critique to Professor Bradley’s position, see David
M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of the Nationalist
Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2000). For Professor Bradley’s
rebuttal, see Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, Part II, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 98 (2000). For critical commentary on Professor Yoo’s thesis, see Martin S. Flaherty,
History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme Law
of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2154-55 (1999).
25. See HENKIN & HARGROVE supra note 4, at 220-24 (describing the balance needed to
adjudicate between preferred constitutional individual rights and the prevailing public interest).
26. See, e.g., HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 573 (2d ed. 2000) (“[I]nternational organizations with
powers of elaboration, implementation, application and enforcement pose issues of state
sovereignty in the most acute form.”).
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human rights law must, therefore, fashion coherent “accommodation
principles” that define more clearly the relationship between international and
domestic law.27
The challenge for U.S. human rights policy is to maximize the benefits
while minimizing the costs of the legalization of human rights norms.
International human rights institutions should be structured so as to
accommodate reasonable domestic policy choices without compromising the
normative integrity of international human rights agreements. To further this
objective, U.S. human rights policy should promote and accept as binding
“accommodation principles” that take seriously both sides of this structural
tension. To illustrate the problem and proposed solution more clearly, I
consider the example of U.S. anti-terrorism policy in the wake of the
September 11th terrorist attacks. After briefly analyzing a few important
aspects the United States’ legal response to the terrorist attacks, I conclude that
the United States must acknowledge that international human rights law
constrains the available policy options even in the area of anti-terrorism (and
even in the context of war).
II. LEGALIZATION AND THE PRINCIPLED ACCOMMODATION OF U.S. NATIONAL
INTERESTS: THE EXAMPLE OF U.S. ANTI-TERRORISM POLICY
Legislation enacted long before the September 11th terrorist attacks
provides the foundation of the anti-terrorism regime in the United States. The
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) authorizes
the Secretary of State to designate an organization as a foreign terrorist
organization if the Secretary finds that the organization is a foreign
organization, the organization engages in terrorist activity, and the terrorist
activity of the organization threatens the security of U.S. nationals or the
national security of the United States.28 The designation by the Secretary of
State results in blocking any funds that the organization has on deposit with
any financial institution in the United States. Representatives and certain
members of the organization are then barred from entry into the United States.
Perhaps most importantly, all persons within or subject to jurisdiction of the
United States are forbidden from “knowingly provid[ing] material support or
resources” to the organization.29
27. See José E. Alvarez, Multilateralism and its Discontents, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 393 (2000).
28. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §302,
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1998)).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1998). Therefore, the designation of a group as a
“foreign terrorist organization” under AEDPA has three legal consequences. First, United States
financial institutions possessing or controlling any funds in which a designated foreign terrorist
organization or its agent has an interest are required to block all financial transactions involving
those funds. § 2339B(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1998). Second, representatives and specified members of a
designated foreign terrorist organization are inadmissible to this country. 8 U.S.C. §
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The Secretary’s power to designate groups as “terrorist” is, however,
subject to judicial supervision. For example, the law requires the Secretary of
State to compile an administrative record supporting the findings that an entity
is a foreign organization engaging in terrorist activities that threaten the
national security of the United States. This record serves as the basis for
judicial review of the Secretary’s findings. The Court of Appeals is to decide
if the Secretary, on the face of things, had enough information to come to the
conclusion that the organizations were foreign and engaged in terrorism, and
the Secretary’s designation of one such organization as an alias of another is
subject to the same scrutiny. In addition, due process requires that the
Secretary of State must give notice to a putative foreign terrorist organization
that such a designation is impending, and the Secretary of State also must
provide such an entity with the opportunity to present rebuttal evidence.30
Furthermore, any prosecutions brought under the AEDPA must comply with
the considerable requirements of U.S. constitutional criminal procedure; that
is, the AEDPA does not establish separate procedures for the trial of
individuals accused of terrorist activity.
The USA Patriot Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act), enacted in the aftermath
of the September 11th attacks, establishes many important changes in U.S.
law.31 Specifically, the USA Patriot Act (1) expands the wiretapping and
intelligence gathering powers of the federal government;32 (2) grants the
Attorney General the authority to certify that an alien meets the criteria of the
terrorism grounds of the Immigration and Nationality Act, or “is engaged in
any other activity that endangers the national security of the United States[,]”
upon a “reasonable grounds to believe” standard, and take such aliens into
custody;33 and (3) establishes a new criminal prohibition against harboring
terrorists, similar to the current prohibition against harboring spies, and makes
it an offense when someone harbors or conceals another they know or should
have known had engaged in or was about to engage in federal terrorism
1182(a)(3)(B) (Supp. IV 1998). Third, it is illegal for persons within the United States or subject
to its jurisdiction to “knowingly” provide “material support or resources” to a designated foreign
terrorist organization. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1998). The Act defines “material
support or resources” to mean “currency or other financial securities, financial services, lodging,
training, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities,
weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets,
except medicine or religious materials.” 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); see also
18 U.S.C. § 2339B(g) (4) (Supp. IV 1998).
30. See Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 208-09 (D.C.
Cir. 2001), reh’g denied (Aug. 27, 2001).
31. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 STAT.
272 (2001) [hereinafter USA Patriot Act].
32. Id. §§ 201-25.
33. See id. § 412(a)(1)-(3).
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offenses.34 Each of these changes constitutes an important expansion of
federal law enforcement powers. By way of illustration, I further explicate the
provisions empowering the Attorney General to detain aliens.
A.

U.S. Anti-terrorism Law after September 11

The USA Patriot Act grants the Attorney General the authority to certify
that an alien meets the criteria of the terrorism grounds of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, or is engaged in any other activity that endangers the national
security of the United States, upon a “reasonable grounds to believe” standard,
and take such aliens into custody.35 The Attorney General must either begin
removal proceedings against such aliens or bring criminal charges within seven
days, or release them from custody.36 An alien who is charged but ultimately
found not to be removable is to be released from custody. An alien who is
found to be removable but has not been removed, and “whose removal is
unlikely in the reasonably foreseeable future,” may be detained if the Attorney
General demonstrates that release of the alien will adversely affect national
security “or the safety of the community or any person.”37 Judicial review of
any action taken under this section, including review of the merits of the
certification, is available through habeas corpus proceedings, with appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.38 The Attorney
General must review his certification of an alien every six months.39
The upshot of these provisions is that the USA Patriot Act permits
indefinite detention of immigrants and other non-citizens. Section 412 requires
that immigrants “certified” by the Attorney General be charged within seven
days with a criminal offense or an immigration violation (which need not be on
terrorism grounds).40 That is, the USA Patriot Act does not require that those
who are detained indefinitely be removable because they are terrorists. For
example, it authorizes indefinite detention of immigrants based upon an
immigration status violation (such as overstaying a visa) if the Attorney
General is unable to deport any such immigrant, as is the case when the
deportable immigrant’s country refuses to accept them. Detention is allowed
on the Attorney General’s finding of “reasonable grounds to believe” the
immigrant involved in terrorism or activity that poses a danger to national
security; and indefinite detention is authorized following a determination that

34. See id. § 803.
35. See id. § 412(a)(1)-(3).
36. USA Patriot Act, § 412(a)(5).
37. Id. § 412(a)(6).
38. Id. § 412(b).
39. Id. § 412(a)(7).
40. Id. § 412(a)(5) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (2000) by adding §§ 236A(a)(3),
236A(a)(6)).
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such an individual threatens national security, or the safety of the community
or any person.41
This broad detention power arguably curtails fundamental constitutional
guarantees. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the indefinite
detention of immigrants who could not be deported poses a “serious
constitutional problem.”42 The Supreme Court did not allow the government
to hold such immigrants, even those who the government said were dangerous
and who did not have a right to remain in the United States, for longer than
would be “reasonably necessary” to secure removal from the U.S.43 Although
the Court did not address indefinite detention of persons ordered removed on
terrorism grounds,44 the Court made clear that such detention would violate the
Constitution without “strong procedural protections.”45 Moreover, the Court
emphasized that indefinite detention would not be allowed “broadly [for]
aliens ordered removed for many and various reasons, including tourist visa
violations.”46
In this way, the USA Patriot Act arguably fails to satisfy the minimum
constitutional requirements outlined by the Supreme Court. Under the USA
Patriot Act § 412, immigrants who are ordered removed but cannot be deported
in the reasonably foreseeable future are entitled to reviews, at least each six
months, of whether they continue to pose a danger.47 But the USA Patriot Act
provides for indefinite detention without a trial, or any other adversarial
hearing, in which the government would have to prove that any such
immigrant is engaged in terrorist activity. Moreover, it authorizes indefinite
detention merely on the basis of vague allegations of threats to national
security.
B.

Arbitrary Detention and International Human Rights Law

Pursuant to these provisions (and an emergency interim regulation
promulgated by the Attorney General),48 the United States has detained well
over 1000 individuals in connection with its investigation of the September
11th attacks. These expanded law enforcement powers are in many respects
inconsistent with international human rights standards. For example, the
detention provisions of the USA Patriot Act authorize deprivations of personal
liberty without sufficient procedural or substantive guarantees. In this respect,
the detentions under § 236 arguably constitute “arbitrary detention” within the
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. § 412(a)(3)-(6).
Zadvydas v. Davis, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 2498 (2001).
Id.
Id. at 2499.
Id.
Id.
USA Patriot Act, § 412 (a)(6)-(7), 115 STAT. at 350-51.
See Disposition of Cases of Aliens Arrested Without Warrant, 8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (2001).
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meaning of prevailing international legal standards. Under Article 9(1) of the
ICCPR, however, no one shall be “subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention”49
or “deprived of his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such
procedure as are established by law.”50 The “principle of legality” recognized
in this provision purports to regulate both the substantive grounds upon which
the detention or arrest is based, and the procedure utilized to effect and confirm
the arrest or detention.51 “Law” in this provision references the general
principles central to the “rule of law” including the requirement that abstract,
accessible, and generally applicable norms dictate the substance and procedure
of any deprivation of personal liberty. Although the ICCPR does not provide a
list of the grounds upon which detentions may be ordered, the prohibition of
arbitrariness does ensure that the law itself is not arbitrary. That is, the
deprivation of liberty is not “manifestly unproportional, unjust or
unpredictable, and [that] the specific manner in which an arrest is made must
not be discriminatory and must be able to be deemed appropriate and
proportional in view of the circumstances of the case.”52 Definitions of
terrorism for which non-nationals can be detained or deported under the USA
Patriot Act are impermissibly broad and include membership in, or any
“material support” for, any foreign or domestic organization designated as a
“terrorist organization” by the Secretary of State or any group that publicly
endorses acts of terrorism, and membership in or support for (including
soliciting funds) any group not designated as “terrorist” but deemed to support
terrorism in some way. In the latter cases, the burden is placed on the detainee
to prove that his or her assistance was not intended to further terrorism.
Article 9(2) of the ICCPR provides that “[a]nyone who is arrested shall be
informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be
promptly informed of any charges against him.”53 These provisions mandate
that anyone who is arrested must be informed of the general reasons for the
arrest “at the time of arrest,” while formal legal charges or accusations must be
furnished “promptly.”54 There must be sufficient information in these

49. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 9(1), 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
50. Id.
51. See MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR
COMMENTARY 174-76 (1993) (proscribing both the right to be informed and special rights for
persons in custody).
52. See id. at 173; see also Womah Mukong v. Cameroon, Comm. No. 458/1991, U.N. Hum.
Rts. Comm., 51st Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991, at 12 (1994), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/undocs/vs45851e.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2002).
53. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 9(2), 999 U.N.T.S. at 175.
54. NOWAK, supra note 51, at 174-75.
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disclosures to permit the detainee to challenge the legality of his or her
detention.55
Article 9(3) provides that all persons arrested or detained on a criminal
charge “shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorized by
law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable
time or to release.”56 Although no bright line test for “promptness” has
emerged, the HRC held that an individual must be brought before a judge or
other officer within “a few days.”57 The ICCPR also provides for the right to
55. See id. at 175; see also Caldas v. Uruguay, Comm. No. 43/1979, U.N. Hum. Rts.
Comm., U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/38/40), at 192 (1983), available at http://www1.umn.edu/
humanrts/undocs/session38/43-1979.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002).
56. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 9(3). Note that Article 9(3) of the ICCPR applies only to
individuals arrested or detained on a criminal charge, while the other rights recognized in the
Article apply to all persons deprived of their liberty. People awaiting trial on criminal charges
should not, as a general rule, be held in custody. In accordance with the right to liberty and the
presumption of innocence, persons charged with a criminal offence, in general, should not be
detained before trial. See id. art. 14(3). International standards explicitly recognize that there are,
however, circumstances in which authorities may detain an accused pending trial. See id. art.
9(3); see also Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention
or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. GAOR, 43rd Sess., Supp No. 49, at 39, U.N. Doc.
A/43/49 (1988) [hereinafter Body of Principles], available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/
instree/g3bpppdi.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002); United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for
Non-custodial Measures (The Tokyo Rules), G.A. Res. 45/110, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp.
No. 49A, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/
i6unsmr.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002); American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978,
art. 7.5, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas3con.htm
(last visited Jan. 27, 2002) [hereinafter ACHR]. For example, pre-trial detention is permissible if
authorities determine that detention is necessary to prevent flight, interference with witnesses, or
when the accused poses a clear and serious risk to others which cannot be contained by less
restrictive means. See Van Alphen v. The Netherlands, Comm. No. 305/1988, U.N. Hum. Rts.
Comm., 39th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/305/1988, at 115 (1990), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf (last visited Mar. 12, 2002) (document can be located via
“SEARCH THE DATABASE,” and “Hugo van Alphen;” or search “By Country,” then
“Netherlands,” and the U.N. Doc. number). Therefore, pre-trial detention must not only be lawful,
but must also be necessary and reasonable in the circumstances.
57. Human Rights Committee, General Comment 8, Article 9, Compilation of General
Comments and General Recommendations, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 16th Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc.
HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 8 (1994) (adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrcom8.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002). Note that this
provision does not explicitly recognize a right to counsel for all accused at this stage of the
proceedings. The Human Rights Committee has stated, however, that “all persons [] arrested must
[have] immediate[] access to counsel . . . .” See Human Rights Committee, Concluding
Observations on Georgia, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 59th Sess., 1564-1566th mtg., at 28, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/79/Add.74 (1997) available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/hrcommittee/
Georgia97.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002). Arguably this right is implicit in the nature of the
protection at issue in Article 9(3), but the lack of a clear requirement precludes universalization of
this interpretation. Other non-binding international resolutions do, however, clearly indicate that
the law is moving in this direction. See, e.g., Body of Principles, supra note 56, at princ. 18(1);
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habeas corpus, or amparo.58 Under this provision, anyone deprived of liberty
by arrest or detention has the right to “take proceedings before a court, in order
that that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and
order his release if the detention is not lawful.”59 Moreover, this provision
implies that the detainee has the right to continuing, periodic review of the
lawfulness of his or her detention.60 Clearly, the seven-day, extra-judicial
detention authorized by the USA Patriot Act departs from prevailing
international standards.
III. TOWARD THE PRINCIPLED ACCOMMODATION OF U.S. NATIONAL
INTERESTS
United States officials justify deprivations of these rights by asserting, not
without some validity, that the unique and grave threat of terrorism requires
exceptional law enforcement measures.61 International human rights treaties

Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, 8th U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.144/28/Rev.1 at 118 (1990), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_comp44.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002) (stating that
“[a]ll persons are entitled to call upon the assistance of a lawyer of their choice to protect and
establish their rights and to defend them in all stages of criminal proceedings.”); Id. at princ. 7
(requiring governments to ensure that all persons arrested or detained have access to a lawyer
within forty-eight hours from arrest or detention); See also id. at princ. 5 (providing that all
persons arrested, charged or detained must be promptly informed of their right to legal
assistance); Id. at princ. 8 (requiring authorities to ensure that all arrested, detained or imprisoned
persons have adequate opportunities to be visited by and to communicate with their lawyer
without delay, interception or censorship, in full confidentiality). It also has been widely
recognized that prompt and regular access to a lawyer for all detainees is an important safeguard
against torture, ill-treatment, coerced confessions and other abuses. See, e.g., Human Rights
Committee, General Comment 20, Article 7, Compilation of General Comments and General
Recommendations, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess., at 11, U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1 at 30
(1994) (adopted by U.N. Human Rights Treaty Bodies), available at http://www1.umn.edu/
humanrts/gencomm/hrcom20.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2002); U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., 41st Sess., at para. 284, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1994/31 (1994).
58. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 9(4).
59. Id.
60. See Body of Principles, supra note 56, at princs. 11(3), 32, 39.
61. See, e.g., Attorney General John Ashcroft, Remarks to the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary (Sept. 25, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2001/
agcrisisremarks9_25.htm.
The American people do not have the luxury of unlimited time in erecting the necessary
defenses to future terrorist acts. The danger that darkened the United States of America
and the civilized world on September 11 did not pass with the atrocities committed that
day. Terrorism is a clear and present danger to Americans today. Intelligence information
available to the FBI indicates a potential for additional terrorist incidents. This new
terrorist threat to Americans on our soil is a turning point in America’s history. It is a new
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allow the suspension of some rights in public emergencies.62 Article 4 of the
ICCPR is representative. For example, it provides that in situations threatening
the life of the nation, a government may issue a formal declaration suspending
certain human rights guarantees as long as (1) a state of emergency that
threatens the life of the nation exists;63 (2) the exigencies of the situation

challenge for law enforcement. Our fight against terrorism is not merely or primarily a
criminal justice endeavor—it is defense of our nation and its citizens. We cannot wait for
terrorists to strike to begin investigations and make arrests. The death tolls are too high,
the consequences too great. We must prevent first, prosecute second.
Id.
62. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., art. 15(1) (1950) (entered into force Mar. 9, 1953) [hereinafter “ECHR”]
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/convention/webConvenENG.pdf (last visited Mar. 12,
2002):
In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High
Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations under this
Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that
such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law.
Id.
In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation and the existence of
which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take
measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with their other obligations under international law . . . .
ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4(1).
In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or
security of a State Party, it may take measures derogating from its obligations under the
present Convention to the extent and for the period of time strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other
obligations under international law . . . .
ACHR, supra note 56, art. 27(1).
The African Charter does not contain a provision allowing States to derogate from their
obligations under the treaty in times of public emergency. See African [Banjul] Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58, available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z1afchar.htm.
63. See SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 195-281; FITZPATRICK, supra note 17;
Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Emergence of Diversity: Differences in Human Rights Jurisprudence,
19 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 101, 103 (1995) (arguing that the concept of a “state of emergency refers
to those exceptional circumstances resulting from temporary factors of a political nature, which,
to varying degrees, involve extreme and imminent danger that threaten the organized existence of
the state’); Fionnuala Ni Aolain, The Fortification of an Emergency Regime, 59 ALB. L. REV.
1353, 1367 (1996) (concluding that a state of emergency may be declared “only if an exceptional
situation of crisis or emergency exists which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat
to the organized life of the community of which the state is composed can a derogation be
invoked.”) (internal citations and alterations omitted) [hereinafter Ni Aolain, Fortification of an
Emergency Regime]; The Lawless Case (Merits), Eur. Ct. Hum. Rts., at para. 28 (Nov. 14, 1960)
(holding that the ECHR’s derogation clauses may be invoked only in “an exceptional situation of
crisis or emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised
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“strictly require” such a suspension;64 (3) the suspension does not conflict with
the nation’s other international obligations;65 (4) the emergency measures are
applied in a non-discriminatory fashion66 and (5) the government notifies the
United Nations (U.N.) Secretary-General immediately.67 The only rights that
are not subject to suspension in this situation are those specified in Article 4 as
protected from derogation.68 The ICCPR specifically identifies several nonderogable obligations including the rights to be free from arbitrary killing;69
torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment70 and
slavery.71 Although the rights to fair trial and personal liberty are derogable
provisions, the Human Rights Committee has suggested that restrictions of

life of the community of which the State is composed”), available at
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/staff/arubin/L201/L201.html. The concept of emergency does include
circumstances other than armed conflict. For example, national disasters and extreme economic
crises may constitute “public emergencies.” See R. St. J. Macdonald, Derogations Under Article
15 of the European Convention on Human Rights, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 225, 225 (1997).
Furthermore, the emergency must be temporary, imminent, and of such a character that it
threatens the nation as a whole. See SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 17; ORAA, supra note
17, at 11-33.
64. This requirement incorporates the principle of proportionality into derogation regimes.
This principle requires that the restrictive measures must be proportional in duration, severity,
and scope. Implicit in this requirement is that ordinary measures must be inadequate; and the
emergency measures must assist in the management of the crisis. See, e.g., ORAA, supra note 17,
at 143; Macdonald, supra note 63, at 233-35.
65. See SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 17, at 624-39.
66. Id. at 640-82.
67. Id. at 683-718; ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4(3); ECHR, supra note 62, art. 15(3); ACHR,
supra note 56, art. 27(3). The Human Rights Committee has emphasized the importance of
notification for effective international supervision of derogations in states of emergency. See
Annual Report of the Committee to the General Assembly, Through the Economic and Social
Council, Under Article 45 of the Covenant and Article 6 of the Optional Protocol, U.N. GAOR,
36th Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex VII, at 110, U.N. Doc A/36/40 (1981).
68. Each convention containing a derogation clause provides an explicit list of nonderogable provisions. See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 4(2) (prohibiting derogation from Articles 6
(right to life), 7 (prohibition on torture), 8 (prohibition of slavery and servitude), 11
(imprisonment for failure to fulfill contractual obligation), 15 (prohibition on retrospective
criminal offence), 16 (protection and guarantee of legal personality), and 18 (freedom of thought,
conscience and religion)); ECHR, supra note 62, art. 15(2); 213 U.N.T.S. at 232 (prohibiting
derogation from Articles 2 (right to life), 3 (freedom from torture), 4 (freedom from slavery), and
7 (retrospective effect of penal legislation)); ACHR, supra note 56, art. 27; Suspension of
Guarantees, Interpretation, and Application, July, 1970, 9 I.L.M. 683 (prohibiting suspension of
Articles 3 (right to juridical personality), 4 (right to life), 5 (right to humane treatment), 6
(freedom from slavery), 9 (freedom from ex-post facto laws), 12 (freedom of conscience and
religion), 17 (right of the family), 18 (right to name), 19 (right of child), 20 (right to nationality),
and 23 (right to participate in government)).
69. See ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 6.
70. See id. art. 7.
71. See id. art. 8.
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these rights are inappropriate even in times of emergency.72 The Committee,
following the lead of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights,73 strongly
suggested that the right to habeas corpus (or amparo) is non-derogable.74
In this way, international human rights treaties authorize states to restrict
or suspend some rights, subject to several requirements, for an identified set of
important public policy objectives.75 These “states of exception,” strike a
balance between universal human rights norms and national interests by
specifying the circumstances in which derogations may be enacted lawfully.76

72. Although the Human Rights Committee recommended against adopting an Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR re-categorizing Articles 9 and 14 as non-derogable, the Committee noted
that states should not derogate from several of the protections included in these articles. The
Committee reasoned that:
The Committee notes that the purpose of the possible draft optional protocol is to add
article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4, and article 14 to the list of non-derogable provisions in
article 4, paragraph 2, of the Covenant. Based on its experience derived from the
consideration of States parties’ reports submitted under article 40 of the Covenant, the
Committee wishes to point out that, with respect to article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4, the issue
of remedies available to individuals during states of emergency has often been discussed.
The Committee is satisfied that States parties generally understand that the right to habeas
corpus and amparo should not be limited in situations of emergency. Furthermore, the
Committee is of the view that the remedies provided in article 9, paragraphs 3 and 4, read
in conjunction with article 2 are inherent to the Covenant as a whole. Having this in mind,
the Committee believes that there is a considerable risk that the proposed draft third
optional protocol might implicitly invite States parties to feel free to derogate from the
provisions of article 9 of the Covenant during states of emergency if they do not ratify the
proposed optional protocol. Thus, the protocol might have the undesirable effect of
diminishing the protection of detained persons during states of emergency.
Human Rights Committee Annual Report to the U.N. General Assembly, U.N. G.A.O.R., 49th
Sess., Supp. No. 40, Annex IX, at para. 2, U.N. Doc. A/49/40 (1994) [hereinafter Human Rights
Committee Annual Report ].
73. See Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2) and 7(6) of the American
Convention on Human Rights), Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. A) No. 8, at 33, OEA/ser.L./V/III.17, doc.
13 (1987) available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_4h.htm (last visited Jan. 26,
2002). See also Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 8 of the
American Convention on Human Rights), Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. A) No. 9, at 41,
OEA/ser.L./VI/III.9, doc. 13 (1987) available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/
b_11_4i.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2002). The Court unanimously held that “‘essential’ judicial
guarantees which are not subject to derogation, according to Article 27(2) of the Convention,
include habeas corpus (Art. 7(6)), amparo, and any other effective remedy before judges or
competent tribunals (Art. 25(1)) . . . .” Id.
74. Human Rights Committee Annual Report, supra note 72.
75. For useful surveys of this area of law, see SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 17;
FITZPATRICK, supra note 17; ORAA, supra note 17.
76. See generally SVENSSON-MCCARTHY, supra note 17 (providing an exhaustive
examination of the relevant treaty provisions and case-law).
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This dimension of accommodation is central since states often justify rights
restrictions by appeal to emergency conditions.77
In light of these concerns, how much should the concern for sovereignty
over such sensitive matters as anti-terrorism law after September 11 affect the
participation of United States in international human rights regimes? The
international law pertaining to “states of exception” provides an excellent
example of the ways in which the United States might incorporate international
norms without sacrificing sovereign autonomy in matters affecting national
security. Under international human rights law, the United States may suspend
various rights protections provided that such derogations are strictly required
to meet the challenges posed by an emergency threatening the polity. These
modest, but important, international legal requirements grapple with the
structural tension between state sovereignty and universal justice.
International human rights law must effectively constrain the ambitions of
national governments. At the same time, fundamental threats to democracy
(such as terrorism) might require a temporary suspension of certain rights to
protect liberty in the long run. Recognizing the sovereign prerogative of states
to make such choices, international human rights norms strive to condition the
exercise of this power. In many respects, this “principled accommodation” of
national interests reveals that international human rights law, properly
conceived, poses no menacing threat to constitutionalism and democracy. That
is, international human rights law in no way constrains the legitimate
ambitions of national governments.
IV. CONCLUSION: LEGALIZATION, DOUBLE STANDARDS, AND U.S. HUMAN
RIGHTS POLICY
The United States, like most national governments, resists any
encroachment by outsiders on the sphere of autonomy over internal affairs.
Indeed, the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of states is, in
many respects, a necessary corollary to sovereign equality. International

77. For example, several governments point to emergency conditions to justify practices
otherwise inconsistent with the ICCPR. See, e.g., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1977, U. N.
Doc. CCPR/C/1/Add.17, 3d. Sess., 67th mtg., Agenda Item 4 (1977) (discussing report filed by
United Kingdom under Article 40 of Covenant); Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant: Initial Reports of States Parties Due in 1977, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/1/Add.25, 4th Sess., 59th mtg., Agenda Item 4 (1978) (discussing report filed by
Chile Under Article 40 of Covenant); Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/1/SR.221, 10th Sess., 221st mtg. Agenda
Item 4 (1980) (discussing report filed by Columbia under Article 40 of Covenant); Uruguay, in
Annual Report of the Committee to the General Assembly: 6th Report, at 365, para. 265, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/1/Add.57, 355th-357th, 359th, 373rd mtg. (1982) (discussing report filed by
Uruguay under Article 40 of Covenant).
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human rights law seems to violate these principles by opening states to outside
investigation, influence, and criticism. International (and supranational)
institutions serve to hold states accountable to other states for their legal
commitments to respect human rights. In this important sense, international
human rights law elevates the sensitive relationship of a state to its own
citizens to a matter of international concern. This development, if taken
seriously, strikes at the very core of state sovereignty. Through reporting
procedures to U.N. treaty bodies, states engage in the unprecedented activity of
self-assessment and disclosure of non-compliance to outsiders. In so doing,
states send representatives to respond to questioning and are condemned for
violations in the treaty bodies’ reports. Furthermore, through political bodies,
such as the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, states are subject to formal
condemnation and even risk resolutions and sanctions by the U.N. Security
Council. Given the trend toward further legalization of international human
rights institutions, states will likely become more concerned about the
imposition of exogenously-defined norms purporting to regulate state action in
areas traditionally considered matters of domestic jurisdiction.
The progressive development of international human rights law, and in
particular the emergence of increasingly legalized international organizations,
has reinforced the political and economic interdependence of many nations.
With this interdependence comes the inevitable tension between the need to
adhere to international obligations and the wish to retain state sovereignty.
States will, of course, struggle to retain sovereign authority to make
fundamental policy choices consistent with national values and needs.
Nevertheless, all states must accept constraints on their freedom of action in
order to obtain the considerable benefits of collective, supranational regulation
and to promote more humane systems of governance.

